Missouri University of Science and Technology

Scholars' Mine
International Conference on Case Histories in
Geotechnical Engineering

(2013) - Seventh International Conference on
Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering

02 May 2013, 4:00 pm - 6:00 pm

Technical Analyses and Lessons of The Embankment Failure at
the Ajka Red Mud Reservoir
József Mecsi
University of Pécs, Hungary

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge
Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Mecsi, József, "Technical Analyses and Lessons of The Embankment Failure at the Ajka Red Mud
Reservoir" (2013). International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 66.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/7icchge/session03/66

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering by an authorized
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

TECHNICAL ANALYSES AND LESSONS OF THE
EMBANKMENT FAILURE AT THE AJKA RED MUD RESERVOIR
József Mecsi
University of Pécs,
Pollack Mihály Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
Pécs, Boszorkány u 2 Hungary 7624

ABSTRACT

This presentation aims at providing an informative fact-based description of the complex reasons resulting in dam
ruptures. The investigations focus on the tragic damage of red mud reservoir No. 10 in Ajka and restrict itself to the
engineering aspects of the damage. The analysis of the direct and indirect reasons for the tragic incident may serve as a
lesson to our engineers and specialists as well as provide guidelines and revelations with the intention of improvement
while emphasizing the necessity of deeper comprehension. Neither this presentation nor the engineering analyses aimed
at the search for scapegoats behind the failures.
INTRODUCTION
In Hungary three alumina plants have been built. One of them
in the vicinity of Ajka town has been operational since 1942,
and collected red mud in a reservoir in the valley of the Torna
stream. The product of alumina production, 15.7 million m³ of
red mud was deposited in 10 reservoirs in the valley of the
Torna stream. The red mud is a waste product of the Bayer
process. Bauxite is crushed and ground in mills and heated;
alumina is precipitated by washing the bauxite with a hot
solution of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) under pressure.

Fig. 1. The site and affected localities
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11491412)

Around 24-45 percent of red mud is ferrous oxide (responsible
for its reddish-brown color), but it also contains other metallic
compounds. Red mud is not poisonous, but it is a hazardous
material, due to its sodium hydroxide content. This highly
alkaline (pH 12-13) material was transported by pipeline to
reservoirs.
On October 4, 2010 at 12:25 the northwestern part of the dam
of red mud reservoir No. 10 has collapsed, and near one
million m3 alkaline red mud mixed with water has plunged in
the valley of the Torna stream. Fig. 1.–Fig5. The red mud
flooded the valley-side parts of the village Kolontár and the
town Devecser, then trough the Marcal river it has reached the
river Danube in very short time. 10 people died, 123 injured,
260 houses became uninhabitable, and significant ecological
damage occurred.
The presentation is based on a series of expert tests performed
to examine the stability aspects of the embankments of
reservoirs as required by the authorities (Mecsi, J. 2010-2012).
The analysis shall not aim to examine the complex issue of
deficiencies in plant operation or in the earlier management of
the reservoir, neither shall it consider the measures to have
been taken by the operating company or the authorities in
order to minimize or to help recognize the risk of a
catastrophic dam failure.

Fig. 2. The corner of the North and the West with water
extension dam (photo: Sándor H. Szabó, MTI)
Fig. 5. Aerial photo with the flooded territory of Kolontár
(photo: MTI)

2.GENERAL CONDITIONS

Fig. 3. The west and the north dam after the failure (index.hu,
photo: AFP - Samuel Kubani)

The embankment of the reservoir in question must be
examined as part of the entire reservoir system, as the different
parts of the system have a mutual impact on each another. The
mutual impact is primarily caused by the water pressure and
the pressure exerted by the tailings, these constituting the
largest part of the load. We must consider the fact that the
entire reservoir system had been built on an extensive gravel
terrace covered by a mixed composition of mud-clay-sand
deposit of the periodical water flow of the 4-5 m Torna stream
bed.
The tragic dam failure of the north-western corner of reservoir
No. 10 highlighted the importance of a complex analysis.
Important aspects of the study are:
•
•
•

Fig. 4. Aerial photo with the alkaline red mud mixed with
water extension

•
•
•
•

the
geological-geotechnical
conditions
and
the
morphological properties of the area;
the conditions changed as a result of favorable technical
interventions or technical interventions believed to be
favorable;
the extreme weather, precipitation and dynamic wind load
conditions;
the specific features of the substance stored in the
reservoirs;
the resistance reducing effects of pressures due to the
transition of the substance from a more favorable condition
to an unfavorable state of liquefaction;
the different rigidity properties of the unfavorable
embankment connections;
and several other factors that could not have been
considered by earlier regulatory systems.

Figure 7 shows an aerial photo of the interconnected system of
reservoirs in its condition prior to the embankment failure.
Fig. 5. Natural-color satellite image of the area surrounding
the spill( http://redsludge.bm.hu/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/image002.jpg)
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Fig. 7. Overhead view of the reservoir system in an aerial
photo of June 2010
The present study does not aim to identify scapegoats of the
incident. The findings and conclusions derived from the
examinations may be further refined and supplemented in the
future in light of further facts and data yet to be revealed.

3. HYDROGRAPHICAL-HIDROGEOLOGY CONDITIONS
The industrial plants and the red mud reservoirs are located in
the 1-3 km wide eroded valley of the Torna stream. Figure 8
shows the original morphology on the second military survey
map (1852). The territory had a basin-like character, fill wit
course gravel and sand and cover fine sand and silt, hence is
had a swampy character, collected the water. Before reaching
the town the stream flows in a regulated bed. The original
streambed was below the red mud reservoirs No. 8-10, but the
stream was diverted in the 1990s when the reservoirs were
built. The damaged dam of red mud reservoir No. 10 had been
built on swampy ground. Geo-morphologically they are
defined by series of mountain margin Mesozoic horsts and
bench lands with piedmont surfaces and mountain margin
sedimentary deposits.
Figure 8 shows the reservoir system after the failure by the
aerial photo. From the picture you can see visually the
reservoir system and the relationship with surrounding terrain.
(Schweitzer F. et al)

Fig. 9. Picture and altitude figures of the reservoir system
after the embankment failure in October 2010
(http://redsludge.bm.hu)
Figure 10 shows the site situation in the years 1970-1976.
From No.1 to No.9. reservoirs were already in operation, most
of the finished the filling with red-mud material, but the
reservoir No. 10 was still in the planning stages. The bed of
the Torna creek position was near to the west side of the dam.
The idea was that reservoir area further expand to the northern
part, but that did not materialize.

Fig. 10. The morphological map from the original
documentation before the built the reservoir No. 10. The
Torna stream’s bed position changes when the dams of the
reservoir were built
4. SUBSOIL CONDITIONS

Fig. 8. The site before the construction of reservoirs on the
second military survey map (1852)
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Figure 11 shows the subsoil conditions of the area based on
detailed soil tests performed between 1975 and 1980.
The reservoir system was built on the gravel terrace (“gravel
basin”), in the 1-3 km wide eroded valley of the Torna stream.
The gravel terrace 5-6 m deep sedimentary deposit.
The deeper part of the “gravel basin” consist of the very
permeable gravel with water permeability of k= 10-1 cm/sec.
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On the right upper part of the Figure illustrates when 2011. in
November created a drainage ditch, highlighting the
liquefiable -unstable soil conditions. The trench sidewalls
suddenly of excavation collapsed.

Fig. 11. Illustration of the subsoil conditions of the reservoir
system based on the original plans (1975 year). (nygroundwater level at rest ;k- coefficient of permeability; IpIndex of plasticity)
The gravel terraces are not homogeneous. This is illustrated by
an exploratory borehole in different soil depths in soil samples
analyzed in terms of particle size distribution curves. (Fig. 12)
The geological origin, the gravel content increases with depth,
diameter of the particles is not evenly spread, dominant in the
fine sand of the same particle size range, which shows the
tendency of soil potential liquefaction.

Fig. 12. Typical particle size distribution diagrams of the soil

In the year 1989 soil excavations and geophysical
measurements were conducted at the leg of reservoir No. 10.’s
dam, and the soil profiles were recorded. Figure 13 shows the
soil profiles near the north-west corner of the reservoir No. 10,
and the photo illustrates the testing locations. It is important to
remark that near the north-west corner of reservoir No. 10
sand-silt is to be found (the former Hungarian naming
standards "flour sand" soil) and sandy-gravel layers above the
fat clay. This "sand-floor" layer was 1.2 to 2.4 m thick.
The storage space of such other part a similar unfavorable soil
layer were not detected.
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Fig. 13. Soil profile near the West –North corner of the
reservoir No. 10. The top right side of the figure shows the
position of the soil investigations

This soil layer unfavorable is that in fine sandy-silt fractions
may move under higher water pressure conditions. As a result,
grain size becomes coarser on the inner side, while a „clay
plug” may develop towards the edge of areas in motion. Such
a clay plug is characterized by a sudden movement under a
significant change in pressure and consequently a mudflowlike grain movement may evolve. Such a process may be
extremely fast and unexpected.
Figure 14 shows the typical results of the soil investigations
by the boring logs after the failure. Compare with the earlier
investigation results you can see that the instable fine sand-silt
layer change to the red mud layer.
It will readily be conceived that the characteristics of the
subsoil underlying the hydraulically solidified slag–ash
embankment constitute an important aspect of the stability of
embankments. It is also important to examine whether the
subsoil may become liquefied under larger water pressures
The CPTu static penetration tests performed on October 7,
2010 in the direct vicinity of the damage location did not show
any resistance until a depth of 2 m, below which it indicated a
sandy gravel layer of a thickness of 3 m. Fig.15. The value of
peak resistance was 40-50 Mpa, which indicates a compacted
condition. An extremely high water pressure value of su=500750 kPa was measured in the water bearing layers of sandy
gravel and gravel, which equals to the water pressure of a 5070(!) m water column. Note: the order of magnitude of the
measured value is significant even considering the fact that
pore water pressure increases during CPTu penetration.
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5. ALTITUDE CONDITIONS
Figure 16 shows crown level heights of the embankments of
Reservoir No. 10 in their condition before the embankment
failure in October 2010. The boundary embankment is split
into sections on the site plan and the altitude data are shown
on a “developed” boundary line.
The figure shows rather significant distortions as horizontal
and altitude scales largely differ from each other.
As it can be observed, the highest section of the dam crown is
between points ‘D’ and ‘E’, i.e. at the embankment between
Reservoirs No. 9 and 10, showing an altitude of 218,0-219
mBf (meters above Baltic Sea level).
The embankment at the northern side of Reservoir No. 10 is
the lowest in altitude, sloping towards the west. The degree of
slope is 1.3–1,5% (as the altitude difference of 1.2–1.4 m
develops at a very long section).

Fig. 14. Soil investigation results after the failure of the dam.
Boring logs- photo and plan with the soil investigation places,
and compare the soil profile before the failure
A clay-silt layer of very low resistance is located under the
compacted gravel layer, which is extremely soft until a depth
of 12 m, with a gradually increasing rigidness at larger depths.
Pore water pressure in the clay layer is insignificant, which
shows that it is the sandy gravel layer that was affected by an
extremely high water pressure.

Fig. 16. Altitude data of the crown level of Reservoir No. 10

Fig. 15. CPT test results 3 days after the failure
It must be emphasized that although the sandy gravel–gravel
soil layer of large bearing capacity is favorable in terms of
potential subsidence, but at the same time it is unfavorable in
terms of water pressures that may evolve in a system of
communicating vessels.
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Fig. 17. Photo of Reservoir No. 10 when the filling of red mud
into the reservoir was at an early stage
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The average crown level height is 217,3 mBf. and the
difference between the lowest and the highest crown levels is
2.5 m, which cannot be regarded as extreme considering the
fact that the total length of the embankments is several
kilometers.
It can also readily be assumed that this embankment section
had been meant to be constructed lower at the initial
construction as it had been considered a temporary
embankment, as an extension in northern direction had been to
be built later, which is clearly confirmed by the original plans.
The original photo – in which the level of red mud filled in the
reservoir indicates the date when the picture was taken – also
clearly shows that the embankment was lower when originally
built (Figure 17.).
Significant differences (4-6 m) is on the north side of the dam
and the east side of the barrier thickness (25-27 m). The
temporary dam was built on the north side, it is assumed that
you have bought into the reservoir space for future expansion
ideas as well.

6. THE CLOSURE OF THE RESERVOIR SYSTEM
Water pollution was detected in the groundwater monitoring
wells near the reservoir system in the 1970s–1980s. In
compliance with the regulatory requirements, a watertight
slurry wall was constructed to close down the southern and the
western sides of the reservoir. Later, as the pollution spread
over towards the north, the construction of a new type of grout
curtain was started around the reservoir system in 1999. The
length of the grout curtain was 1045 m on the northern side,
200 m on south side, and there were connected to the already
existing slurry wall. Figure 18 shows the boundary structure
around the reservoir system. The depth of the vertical closure
was determined in relation to the depth of the watertight clay
substratum, by minimum 1.0 m bellow it. The depth of the
southern wall varies between 3.0 and 8.0 m, while 6.0-9.012.0 m appear on the south-eastern side.

Fig. 18. Site plan of the slurry wall and grout observed in the
1998 year (curtain boundary constructed at several stages)
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7. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMBANKMENT
The boundary embankments show some special features. As
they were made of slag and ash from the power plant, their
weight is relatively low. Their average density is = 1.5-1.55
gr/cm3, while their dry density is s= 0,7-0,8 gr/cm3.The
embankment is quasi-saturated with water. Due to the
hydraulic chemical bond, the embankment is characterized by
a relatively large strength. As a result of the construction
technology applied, the embankment is layered and is of
inhomogeneous structure, which manifests both in its strength
and its water permeability characteristics. Figure 19 shows a
characteristic profile of the northern embankment of Reservoir
No. 10 after the failure.
Typical material tests were performed of the southern
embankment by the Institute of Environmental Management
of the University of Miskolc in November 2010. It must be
noted that properties determined at the embankment of
Reservoir No. 10/a may differ from the test results of the
embankment of Reservoir No. 10, but in general, they give an
approximate picture of the strength, water permeability and
density properties of the embankment. The dam material is
horizontally layered and is inhomogeneous in the sense that it
is built up of layers of finer and coarser grain composition.
The joint surfaces detected in core samples were located in the
zones composed of coarser grains as the stability of zones with
coarser grains is lower than that of layers built up of finer
grains.
The value of unidirectional compressive strength of the coarse
grain samples was 0.5-0.8 MPa at deeper sampling locations,
while it was significantly lower, 0.2-0.45 MPa closer to the
surface. In the case of fine grain samples the value of
unidirectional compressive strength was usually between 1.52.5 MPa and in some extraordinary cases it reached as much
as 2.8-2.9 MPa.

Fig. 19. Material of the northern embankment of Reservoir
No. 10 after the embankment failure (photo: Dr. Tibor
Horváth, November 2010)
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Breaking strength values were around 4.5-6 kN at failures
along the edge in the coarser and finer beds. In highly
stratified zones composed of coarse grains, breaking force was
as low as 2.5-4 kN, while in well preserved samples of the
best bearing capacity, values of as much as 10 kN and in some
cases 15 kN were observed.
In general, the core samples show good compressive and
tensile strength in their natural condition, their unidirectional
compressive strength being around 1.5 MPa, while in the case
of failure along the edge the compressive strength at the centre
line is calculated at 0.9 MPa and the tensile strength is of an
average value of 0.3 MPa. The samples are of low hydraulic
conductivity, falling in the range of mud–muddy clay–clay.
Test results show that the typical seepage factor of the samples
was within the range of 10-9–10-8 m/s but in the case of a few
samples values higher or lower than this range were measured,
at 5,8•10-10 – 2,5•10-7 m/s. In light of the above, the coarsegrain layers of low bearing capacity practically showed the
seepage factor of a mud soil, while the more compact layers
had that of fat clay. The impermeability of samples drops
along with the decrease of grain size and thus along with the
growth of total porosity. When a sudden increase of tension
was exerted on the samples, they lost approximately third of
their strength. However, no correlation was found between the
size of the compression wave and the loss of strength within
the range of 4-8 bars.”
8. PROPERTIES OF THE “RED MUD”
“Red mud” is a by-product of alumina production, in the
process of which bauxite is processed using the Bayer process.
Bauxite is crushed and ground in mills and heated; alumina is
precipitated by washing the bauxite with a hot solution of
sodium hydroxide under pressure. “Red mud” is then gained
from the remaining solution by settling and filtering.
The properties of “red mud” are reviewed drawing on past
experience in a very informative article about the geotechnical
aspects of hydraulic spoil banks (Asbóth, János – Szivák,
Attila: Geotechnical aspects of hydraulic spoil banks, Civil
Engineering Review, Volume XXXII, issue 12/1982, pp. 538546). The statements of the article were later confirmed by the
findings of tests performed later. „The Fe2O3 content of red
mud is high and therefore material density is also higher than
in average clays: it is s =2,9–3,3gr/cm3. The value of water
content varies within the range of w=150– 200 %. Bulk
density is =1,3–1,5gr/cm3 in freshly settled clay and = 1,5–
1, 7 gr/cm3 in clay settled for years.
Comparing the material density and the bulk density data it
can be stated that the substance stored in the red mud reservoir
is of extremely loose structure. In its fresh condition the void
ratio of the clay varies between e = 4–6, while it is between 2–
4 in spoil banks settled and abandoned for years.”
The extraordinary volume changing character is shown by the
fact that after the desiccation of its surface, cracks of 3-8 cm
appear on it (Figure 20). In spite of the fact that the cracks
penetrate into a depth of as much as a meter, the substance is
characterized by a creamy consistency only a few millimeters
under the surface.

Paper No. 3.47a

Fig. 20. The extraordinary volume changing character after
the desiccation of red-mud surface, cracks of 3-8 cm appear
on it (Surface of the “red mud” in dry condition (photo: J.
Mecsi)
Corresponding liquid limit and plasticity index values in a
Casagrande plasticity chart shows that the points plotted fall
into the range of organic substances without exception. The
description of the substance as „red mud” is not appropriate in
terms of soil mechanics, as considering plasticity index, it
belongs to the group of substances of medium to high
plasticity according and should be described as medium and
fat clay.
The following questions arise:
• What special characteristics determine the behaviour of
the substance if it is defined as medium and fat clay,
and it is to be regarded as a near-watertight material
according to its permeability coefficient?
• Why can we not expect that the substance, as a
watertight material, will prevent water seepage at the
bottom of the reservoir and near its wall?
“Shear strength tests were performed with an airfoil shear
probe. Examining the test results it can be stated that the
authoritative shear strength is 10 kN/m2 on the settling area
currently in use, which approximately corresponds with the
triaxial test results. Shear strength tests performed in the
abandoned spoil bank showed more diffuse results than those
in the currently used one, but the authoritative value was
around 10 kN/m2 there, too.
These tests also confirmed that “red mud” does not lose its
water content and its shear strength does not increase along
with the time passing.”
Chemical effects, such as that of sodium hydroxide added to
the swollen clay in the course of the technological process,
may also have a role in the special behavior of “red mud”.
It can conclusively be stated that the substance shows special
thixotropic behavior, it does not easily lose its water content
and assumes the behavior of a thick, plastic liquid upon
significant loading.
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9. PRECIPITATION DATA BETWEEN 2000 AND 2010

11. WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTIONS

Fig.21 shows a graphic presentation of the precipitation data
provided in a table by the Weather Data Services Department
of the National Weather Service on October 8, 2010.

The prevailing wind direction in the vicinity of Reservoir No.
10 is northern–north-western as shown in the wind direction
frequency chart. Wind parallel with the direction of the
embankment failure is very rare (Figure 22).
Peculiar wind conditions were observed in the area between
September 25 and October 4. Between October 1 and 4, a
gradually strengthening, unfavorable wind speed toward the
direction of the embankment failure was accompanied by
casual wind gusts (Weather data services, National weather
Services, October 8, 2010).

Fig. 21. Total precipitation data in the 1st– 3rd quarter year
between 2000 and 2010. The figure shows data from two
observation places near the investigated territory
Comparing the total precipitation of the period between
January and the end of September 2010 with that of 2009, a
44% increase can be observed, while comparing the same with
2008 data, the increase in precipitation is 74%. This volume of
water is rather significant considering the character of the
drainage basin. The volume of total precipitation in the period
between January and the end of September 2010 is more than
one and a half times higher than the 10-year average (154%).

10. GROUNDWATER LEVEL AND WATER PRESSURE
MONITORING DATA
The surface levels and the ground water levels observed in the
area of the entire reservoir system. The initial water level at
Reservoirs No. 6 and 7 was between 210-215 m. above the
Baltic See (mBf.) according to the monitoring performed in
2011 (Budapest University of Technology, Geotechnical
Department, March 2011), while the highest water pressure
level observed at Reservoir No. 10 was 197,4 mBf on the
northern side and 191,5 mBf on the southern side According
to the above data, the difference in water pressure level is 1517 m, with an additional 9.5 m between the northern and the
southern parts of Reservoir No. 10. The above data were
gained during a period of very low precipitation in 2011, while
in 2010 precipitation was especially high. In light of the
above, it can be concluded that the boundary walls constructed
around the reservoir system due to environmental reasons in
accordance with the requirements of the authorities had a very
unfavorable effect, as a result of which the system could
gather a very significant amount of precipitation in 2009-2010,
which resulted in extremely high differences in water level
and therefore extremely high differences in water pressure.
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Fig. 22. Vectors of prevailing wind directions and wind speeds
between September 25, 2010 and October 4, 2010 (Weather
Data Services Department of the NWS)

Fig. 23. Effects of the wind speeds between September 25 and
October 4, 2010
The observations of the wind direction and velocity were at 10
m over the ground surface, but the top surface of the reservoir
is 23-24m. It is mean that the wind velocity in site should be
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significant more than the measured value. The highest wind
speed values were measured on October 4, with an average of
22 km/h and occasion wind gusts of 60 km/h.
There is reason to assume that these unusual wind direction
and wind speed conditions contributed to the development of
the embankment failure. In addition, the possible sucking
effect of the wind on the northern side of the embankment
must also be taken into consideration. Fig. 23.

occasionally rose but only to a very slight extent.
At locations 3a, b and c the total value of subsidence was 60
mm within a period of 7 years, which indicates an annual
subsidence of 8 mm.
Monitoring data show a realistic range of values and further
confirm the conclusions of the analysis. Furthermore, they
verify the lengthy seepage process and washout of fine grains
under the dam.

12. SATELLITE MONITORING DATA
Following the embankment failure, the Satellite Geodetic
Observatory (KGO) of the Institute of Geodesy, Cartography
and Remote Sensing (FÖMI) published its monitoring data in
respect of Reservoir No. 10 on the internet. “InSAR study of
the failed red mud reservoir near Kolontár, Figure 24.
It can be concluded from the monitoring data that the
maximum range of the values measured was 1–1.3 cm/year
and it showed a steady, gradually increasing tendency. At a
few locations however a lower increase of a total value of 1.0–
2 cm was measured within a period of 7 years.

35 mm
70 mm

2a,2b,2c
85 mm

4a,4b,4c
85 mm
85 mm

13. CIRCUMSTANCES AND COMPLEX CAUSES
The area is located in the lowest part of the drainage basin of
the Torna stream, i.e. in the valley of the stream. In its original
condition, the area, together with the subsurface stream valley
formed a surface and subsurface water flow unit which was
very sensitive to weather conditions. The area had been
gradually involved in and shaped by industrial operations,
through the construction of surface and subsurface structures.
The northern, so called intermediate embankment of Reservoir
No. 10, constructed in a smaller size with a view to the
possible extension of the reservoir system, served as an
external, i.e. boundary embankment. As a result, it was the
surface run-off and flow conditions that were first changed
significantly by the industrial use of the area in the stream
valley.
It can be concluded that according to an engineering approach
to finding the causes, the failure of the rigid embankment of
large bearing capacity was a combined result of a number of
unfavourable conditions.
The base width of the northern embankment is significantly
different from the size of the other embankments, as it was
considered a temporary structure, bearing in mind the
possibility of a future extension. The slightly more than 20 m
height of the solid part of the embankment is lower than the
26–27 m heights of the other embankments.

3a,3b,3c
85 mm

Fig. 24. Summary of the satellite monitoring data
[DigitalGlobe, Sample Imagery Gallery, Earth explorer: U.S.
Geological Survey http://edcsns17.cr.usgs.gov/EarthExplorer/
(2011), Satellite Geodetic Observatory (KGO) of the Institute
of Geodesy, Cartography and Remote Sensing (FÖMI)]

The range of subsidence and movements is not significant but
is indicative and can primarily originate from the “unsettled”
behavior of the soil underlying the dam. Even considering
measurement inaccuracy, the values measured cannot be
regarded significant.
At locations 4a, b and c the subsidence of the embankment
was 80 mm/7 years, i.e. 12-13 mm/year.
At locations 2a, b and c a slight rising of the embankment was
experienced along a four-year period starting in 2003; the
movement was later stabilized and the embankment
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Fig. 25. Dimensions of the western and southern dams
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Its effect manifested at the northern embankment – being by
25 m less in base width than the western embankment – as the
resistance against displacement here was significantly lower,
and also because the rigidity of the western and northern
embankments showed significant difference at an
unfavourable connection at the corner of the reservoir.
We concluded, that at the connection of the stronger west dam
and softer north dam a very big tensile force could occur,
while at the middle of the north dam big torsion force
developed. Fig. 25. and Fig 26.

Fig. 28. The damaged reservoir of an alumina plant is seen
from the air near the village of Kolontar, Hungary, Monday,
Oct. 11, 2010. AP / Abel Szalontai

Fig. 26. The cracking at the middle of the north dam

The geotechnical conditions were determined by the fact that
at the northern boundary embankment of the reservoir there
are beds of easily liquefiable muddy fine sand (or sand flour as
described earlier) in a layer of 3-4 m located in the closest
vicinity of the critical corner of the reservoir, adjacent to a
sandy-gravelly layer.
Significant pore water pressure may have developed in the soil
layer underlying the embankment as a result of the geological
properties of the enclosed gravel terrace functioning as a
drainage basin and due to extremely high precipitation levels
causing high water pressure conditions. Fig. 29.

The deformed, distorted northern dam after the catastrophic
rupture, was not at rest.
Fissures started developing on the crown level of the northern
dam section at a gradually increasing pace 3 days after the
dam failure, following which the embankment subsided in 3040 m pieces, with 20-30 cm settlements. Fig 27.
The leaking red mud stored in the reservoir left a crater by the
inner side of the embankment, as a result of which the foot of
the dam became exposed. (On in situ observations by J.
Mecsi)

Fig. 29. Summarizing some effects for the dam failure

Fig. 27. Picture of the North dam of the reservoir No. 10 on
October 7, 2011 based on in situ observations (photo: J.
Mecsi)
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The increase of load on the slope surface of the embankment
might have contributed to the excess load – and the increase of
soil stress – in the subsoil on the inner side and as a
consequence, to excess subsidence, while it probably caused a
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slighter rate of expansion on the outer side due to the rigid
body like movement of the embankment.
The uneven layer structure of the subsoil might have
contributed to the possible development of torsion loading at
the northern embankment, which is indicated by cracks.
The extremely rigid but light embankment and the soft,
liquefiable subsoil provided highly unfavourable static
conditions.
The liquefaction property and special thixotropic behavior of
the “red mud” may have also contributed to the disaster.
Chemical effects, such as that of sodium hydroxide added to
the swollen clay in the course of the technological process,
may also have a role in the special behavior of “red mud”.
The extremely unfavorable wind direction and wind speed
conditions may have given a final push toward the very
sudden embankment failure.
It is also an important factor for the stability of the dam, that
by what kind of filling technology is used. In what magnitude
and distribution of water heights may occur within the area of
the reservoir?
The list of contributing factors could be further extended and
it will readily be conceived that it is the accumulation of
unfavourable conditions that led to the sudden rupture of the
embankment.

15. REFERENCES

The present study does not aim to identify scapegoats of the
incident. The findings and conclusions derived from the
examinations may be further refined and supplemented in the
future in light of further facts and data yet to be revealed.

Mecsi J. [2012]. “Engineering analysis of the Tragic Damage
of a Reservoir dam (Egy zagytározó gátszakadásával
kapcsolatos
mérnöki
elemzések,
tanulságok)”
16th
International Conference on civil Engineering and
architecture Hungarian Technical Scientific Society of
Transylvania, ISSN 1843-2123 pp. 263-271 (In Hungarian)

Asboth J.et al. [1982] “Geotechnical aspects of hydraulic spoil
banks”( Civil Engineering Review, Volume XXXII, issue
12/1982, pp. 538-546. Hungary (In Hungarian.)
Kovács B. [2011]. “Report on the testing of dam material
gained from samples of the repeated core drillings performed
at locations PVf1 and PVf2 by the Geovil Ltd near Reservoir
No. 10/a of the MAL Co”. (In Hungarian)
Mecsi J. [2010]. “Expert opinion on the filling of the Ajka
Reservoir No. 10/a) ME-SZI Engineering Expert Office.
József Mecsi, October 12, 2011. (In Hungarian.)
Mecsi J. [2012]. “Expert opinion on the examination of the
embankment between Reservoirs No. 10 and 9” ME-SZI
Engineering Expert Office. January 15, 2012. (In Hungarian.)
Mecsi J. [2011]. “Red mud disaster - facts without commentsIn Collapse Understanding to Solution Book (In Hungaian:
Káresetek a megértésen át a megoldásokig”), Edited by: J.
Mecsi, Mérnöki Kamarai Kiskönyvtár 2nd edition ISBN 978963-88358-1-9, ISSN 2062-5081 pp. 159-166

14. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The present study aims to provide a background to a nonexhaustive list of factors contributing to the embankment
failure, while attempting to give a clear picture of the complex
technical conditions.
The rupture of the embankment and the highly serious disaster
emerging thereof serve as a lesson in several aspects for
professionals performing technical or legislative tasks, as well
as for those working in the area of the administration of justice
and performing official control duties.
It is not an aim of the present study to identify scapegoats for
the incident.
The findings and conclusions derived from the examinations
may be further refined and supplemented in the future in light
of further facts and data yet to be revealed.
The objective of the author of the present analysis is, led by
deep sympathy for the victims and those who suffered damage,
to provide an insight into the technical causes and the
circumstances of the tragic incident, as well as to promote,
with a humble approach to sciences, all endeavors to avoid
such disasters in the future.
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